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Abstract. The Mayor of Jayapura City is leading the city to be religious, advanced, modern, prosperous, and uphold local wisdom.
As the capital of Papua Province, this city faces a prolonged problem of inequality from within the city, with the province of West
Papua, and neighboring Papua New Guinea. The paper questions how Jayapura City, as the capital of Papua Province manages
inequalities and drive the economic sector forward based on the Organizational Conflict Model of Pondy (1967). Results of indepth interview and secondary data research were analyzed based on qualitative analysis. Inequalities have hit indigenous Papuans
the hardest. They are also facing the pressure of higher skilled settlers from other parts of Indonesia and encroachment from the
indigenous mountain Papuans. Based on the model, we have found that the Mayor has been responsive to mitigate potential
conflicts. The bureaucracy is supported by the military, police, community leaders, and academics. We argue that representative
bureaucracy taking into account customary law and indigenous beliefs will reduce tension in the society and receive support in
program implementation of the city.
Keywords: indigenous Papuans, special autonomy, inequalities, conflict, local governance
Abstrak. Walikota Jayapura ingin memimpin kotanya menjadi religius, maju, modern, sejahtera, dan menjunjung tinggi
kearifan lokal. Sebagai ibu kota dari Provinsi Papua, kota ini menghadapi permasalahan kesenjangan yang berkelanjutan dari
dalam kota, antarprovinsi dengan Papua Barat, dan dengan negara tetangga Papua Nugini. Makalah ini mempertanyakan
bagaimana Kota Jayapura, sebagai ibu kota Provinsi Papua mengelola kesenjangan untuk mendorong kemajuan di sektor
ekonomi berdasarkan Model Konflik Organisasi dari Pondy (1967). Hasil dari penelitian dengan wawancara mendalam
dan data sekunder dianalisis berdasarkan pendekatan kualitatif. Kesenjangan paling berdampak pada Orang Asli Papua.
Juga akibat tekanan kehadiran para pendatang dari wilayah Indonesia dengan keterampilan lebih tinggi, dan perambahan
orang asli Papua dari pegunungan. Berdasarkan model, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa walikota sangat responsif untuk
memitigasi potensi konflik. Birokrasi didukung oleh militer, polisi, kepala adat, dan akademisi. Makalah ini berargumentasi
bahwa birokrasi yang representatif akan mengurangi tekanan di masyarakat dan mendapat dukungan untuk implementasi
program kota.
Kata kunci: orang asli Papua, otonomi khusus, kesenjangan, konflik, pemerintah daerah

INTRODUCTION
Since the Soekarno era, the Government of Indonesia
has invested in the economic development of Irian Jaya,
now Papua and Irian Jaya Barat, now called West Papua.
The irony of the development policies is the fact that after
36 years, the problem of economic inequalities and poverty
remains the same. Economic development in Papua exceeds
those of West Papua and even Papua New Guinea (PNG).
This increased economic and political tension between the
provinces and the neighbouring country (Hasting, 1983).
To solve the problem of regional inequality in Papua,
the central government of Indonesia granted individual
autonomy for indigenous Papuans as affirmative policy
based on Law No. 21 the Year 2001 to manage their politics
and achieve welfare in order to push development in these
regions forward.
Jayapura, as the capital city of Papua Province, has

always maintained as the highest Human Development
Index (HDI) in the region (Central Bureau of Statistic,
2017), and is one of the highest transit area or end destination of nation extensive travelers. The challenges are that
it attracts indigenous Papuans from the mountains areas
who live with an average HDI of 30% (Central Bureau of
Statistic, 2015) and from PNG where more than 39% of its
citizens are living below poverty (ADB, 2009). Incoming
settlers, especially Javanese, Bugis, Butonese, and Makassar
brings their skills and develop the economy of the city. This
has led the demography of Papua Provinces being imbalanced. Based on internal documentation by Ilalang Papua,
increased populations escalate the rate of criminal activities
such as motor vehicle theft (curanmor), theft with violence
(curas), and robbery (begal). The number of vehicle theft
increased from 463 cases (2013) to 944 cases (2014), and
heavy persecution from 571 cases (2013) to 944 cases
(2014). Thievery dominates the criminal records in 2015

34

International Journal of Administrative Science & Organization, January 2019
Bisnis & Birokrasi: Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi dan Organisasi

(Pasificpos, 2015). Conflicts documented in these provinces due to economic and demographic backgrounds are
the conflict in Sorong (1990 and 2014), the Bugis-ButonMakassar (BBM) conflict in Manokwari (2013), Jayapura
(1996), and Timika (2014-2015). In the city, ethnic conflicts
often happen at Expo Terminal in Waena-Jayapura between
the Timorese and Makassar. The driver of these conflicts is
the temperamental attitude of the BBM ethnic groups and
indigenous Papuans, easily triggered by matters of identity,
ethnicity, and religion.
The mission of Jayapura city is to be a model city for
tolerance; economic development based on the city services and trade potentials, with sustainable environmental
friendly city utilities. Mayor Mano created a professional
bureaucracy with good governance. Policies are priorly
evaluated based on future conflict potentials arising from
inequalities, identities, and ethnic issues. The city program
“Prospect” from the Special Autonomy budget concentrate
to develop the skills of its citizen, especially indigenous
Papuans to reach welfare and actively involved in the local
politics while maintaining their traditional values and culture (Ajoi, 2016). Innovative programs and public services
proved to be successful and sustainable when indigenous
institutions are involved (Harding and Sidel, 2015).
The city government created the Agency for Unity,
Politics, and Community Protection Agency (Badan
Kesatuan, Politik, dan Perlindungan Masyarakat/
Kesbangpollinmas) in 2012 under the mandate of Law
Number 7 the Year 2012 on Managing Social Conflict.
The relationship between the Provincial Unity, Politics, and
Community Protection Agency (Badan Kesbangpollinmas)
with the agency in the city is administratively in harmony.
The city bureaucracy was adjusted following social needs
and the function of “community protection” was moved
to the Public Order Agency (Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja/
Satpol PP).
In a conflict-prone society, the government organization will respond by developing skills and strategies to
strengthen the internal organization and able to respond
to external challenges (Perez, 2018). There are three interrelated events in observing conflict management: a) how
unacceptable conflict is perceived or experienced; b) to
diagnose the source of conflict; c) to intervene (Kilmann
and Thomas, 1978). Pondy (1967) has created a conflict
model to analyze based on events or in which stage are
the episodes. In other studies, organizational behavior and
conflict pattern become the focus of the analysis (Pondy,
1992; Schein, 2010). In Pondy (1992), he argues with his
conceptual views that conflict is the very essence of an
organization. Internal and external factors escalate and
de-escalate conflict through inter-connectedness between
different independent entities. Destructive conflict should
be managed, and resolution sought to avoid disruption.
The government of Jayapura City created policies and
implemented programs to enhance indigenous Papuans in
various fields in order for them to adjust to the economy of
the city. Together with stakeholders in the community, the
administration jointly manages the city challenges including
conflicts. By using the Pondys’ framework this paper elaborate on how the current bureaucracy manages to maintain
the highest human development index in Papua Province.

Volume 26, Number 1
RESEARCH METHOD

The case study of Jayapura City aims to find solvency
for the problem of economic inequality, the conflict
between indigenous groups, and migrants from other areas.
How the city government can be proactive in preventing
conflict. This research aims to analyze the bureaucracy and
governance of Jayapura city in furthering the economy and
managing conflict by using Pondys’ (1967) framework
to analyze government administration models. In Papua,
governance based on customary law and strong indigenous
ties plays a stronger role than public governance. In this
situation, the public government should represent groups
in the society, with a role in mediating between the local
democracy and the bureaucracy design (Groeneveld and
Van de Walle, 2010). The framework should capture the
conflict phenomena in the city organization and classified
them into three primary models: the bargaining conflict
model looks at relationships among parties and interest
groups; the bureaucratic conflict model sees the superiorsubordinate relationship between the parties; the model,
observe the lateral or working relationship among parties.
Each type of conflict is identified in five stage episodes:
1) latent conflict; 2) perceived conflict (cognition); 3) felt
conflict (affection); 4) manifest (conflict behavior); 5)
conflict aftermath, as shown in the Figure 1.
The framework of a conflict dynamic episode looks at
the conflicted relationship between two or more individuals in an organization, and analyze based on the sequences
and episodes of the conflict. Several potential factors with
variety of traits build up based on condition, affection,
perception, and behavior. The culmination will be in the
form of open war or aggression in an episode, however
not all conflict reaches this phase.
The Latent conflict, consist of three basic types: 1)
scarce resources competition; 2) in reach for autonomy;
3) the divergence of subunit goals. The potential conflict
omits the role conflict, whereas, in a role set, each has
its focal point and a role sender. When a person receives
incompatible expectation or role demands, then conflict
will happen (Hoang and Gimeno, 2005). Perceived conflict, is caused by parties misunderstanding arise from
difficulties in understanding and accepting personal behavior or bad experience from task incoherencies. Action for
resolution suggest for the members involved to be able
to find and express their ‘blind spots’, admit their error or
able to elaborate their misunderstanding (Einarsen, Hoel,
Cooper, 2003). Sometimes people give wrong interpretation by negatively thinking about someone else. Therefore
good communication to be able to express ones’ feeling
can lead to trust and strengthen the relationship (Abiodun,
2014). Felt Conflict, is the personalization of conflict that
may lead to the organizational crisis by aggregated organizational and extra-organization actors. These interactions
examine the level of trust that enables them to exchange
essential or sensitive information (Jarzabkowski and Paul
Spee, 2009). Manifested Conflict is based on the mind of
the actor reflected in his or her behavior that frustrated
the goal of one or several participants. This conflict has
several varieties such as political turmoil, labor unrest, violence and prison riots; those are forms of open aggression.
However, violence will rare happen when organizational
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norms are present. The process of attaining social norms
can be similar for different types of organization such as
structure, roles, and capacity building, or different when
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it involves advocacy and norm passed utilizing narration
(Rynes, Bartunek, Dutton and Margolis, 2012). The effect
of organizational conflict on individual welfare is not the

Figure 1. The Dynamics of a Conflict Episode (Pondy, 1967)
Source: Processed by the author (2018)

focus of Pondys’ framework (Perez, 2018). Therefore
improvement of organizational cohesiveness, solvency,
adaptability, and equality will improve performance.
Pondys’ organizational model can capture how conflict creates dis-equilibrium by polarizing members of the
society based on their differences in political preference,
racial differences, economic inequalities, and access to
resources. This model suggests that evaluation of conflicts should be based on its individual, and organizational
functions or dysfunctions, to see their positive or adverse
effects. Evolution of policy instruments can take the form
of a market mechanism or a regulatory mechanism that
assures the evolution of orderly allocation of scarce
resources (Pondy, 1967).
Conflict management in administration will succeed
if the appropriate measures are used for each different
types of conflict. Pondy (1967) focussed on how the
conflict will lead to effective organizational functioning, while recent studies found that different conflict
leads to different innovation (Amason, 1996; De Clerq,
Thongpapanl and Dimov, 2009; Jehn, 1995). Task conflict
happens in group relationship over opinions and viewpoints in how to implement a task. This conflict affects
the relationship between members, their performances
and satisfaction (Curşeu and Schruijer, 2010). Process
conflict emerges in dividing and delegating responsibilities (Jehn and Mannix, 2001). Status conflict is a conflict
by an individual to gain or maintain their status (focus on

oneself) in a zero-sum game situation where the other will
have a lower rank in the hierarchy (focus on the other)
(Bendersky and Hays, 2012). Group conflict asymmetry
will decrease group performance and creativity if the
degree of conflict perception between the members is high
(Dineen, Noe, Shaw, Duffy and Wiethoff, 2007; Klein
and Kozlowski, 2000; Jehn, Rispens and Thatcher, 2010).
Decentralization is an instrument for managing conflict
aggravated by issues of ethnicity, religion, and even if too
many political parties, in the political system (Prasojo,
Maksum and Kurniawan, 2006). A representative bureaucracy should support the instrument, whereas equality of
power, opportunities, and diversity of the government
and its citizen forms the motives of the bureaucracy.
Political power balance is taken into account to understand the level of the organization legitimacy, capacity,
and effectiveness. The goal is to maintain political stability, harmony, and control (Groeneveld and Van de Walle,
2010). When a conflict mechanism meets the demand
of all participants, the relationship can be more orderly,
with cooperative behavior to focus on solving potential
conflicts. The mechanism should be the form of a new
institutional arrangement with its organizational behavior that accommodates suppressed groups and interest
together (Scott, 2005).
Jayapura City has an area of 940.000 Ha that lies in
Humbolt Bay. This city is an administrative extension of
Jayapura District. The area is divided into five districts,
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i.e. Abepura, Heram, South Jayapura, North Jayapura,
and Muara Tami. Since the Dutch occupation followed by
the allies, Abepura has been the center of administrative
activities together with Jayapura, separated by mountains.
In 1962 the earliest transmigrant that came to Jayapura
in large numbers were government officials. Through the
years, more and more incoming settler came to Jayapura
until the numbers exceed the indigenous Papuans. Distrust
and jealousy of members of society are due to inequalities
leads to conflicts. Moreover, crime rates are increasing
due to more high skill criminals, inconsistent policy and
approach on alcohol, and illegal smuggling of marijuana
(Baharuddin, 2017).
The research was divided into three periods of eighteen months with a team that consists of two leading
researchers based in Depok, one researcher and one assistant in Jayapura city. The first six-month was preparation
period by reading all available literature on Jayapura City.
Data compiled is reduced into relevant topics for the
research study. Instruments for a qualitative study with
research questions and training materials were design
based on the literature review. In the second period, the
research team of two people was formed in Jayapura
City and trained on topics of Jayapura City and administrative studies, research methods, and the instruments
that will be used for interviewing, observing, or organizing FGDs. They advised which informants we should
interview from government officers, indigenous leaders,
community leaders, religious leaders, and academics.
During data collection, the local team is allowed to recruit
volunteers. The interviews were informants of Jayapura
citizen, various community organization, and religious
and indigenous leaders, the police, and bureaucrats. The
analysis aims to understand issues of indigenous Papuans
from administrative studies perspectives. Data collected
were analyzed in Depok and classified based on national
policies affecting Jayapura, the government of Jayapura,
and the society of Jayapura. Data reduction methods used
the method from Huberman and Miles (2002). It was
found that Jayapura City is managed under the public
system and also by strong customary system governance.
The team organized a focus group discussion (FGD) in
Abepura by inviting all involved in the first phase data
collection to present the analysis and discuss improvements. The aim was to confirm the result analysis from
the first data collection. Back in Depok instruments for
the next in-depth interviews were design based on the
FGD discussion. In the last phase, the local researchers were trained to do an in-depth interview for at least
two hours each targeting stakeholders affected by the
policy with administrative problems. They were trained
to observe and report local condition in support of the
interview. The last batch of data was tested based on different theories and paradigm in Depok, to conclude that
Pondy (1967) model was the most comprehensive tool
to capture administrative matters managed by the public
and customary governance.
We organize the article into three main sections, the
introduction about the context of Jayapura city. Following
the introduction is the methodology of how Pondys’ model
will be used. The result and discussion will elaborate
cases in Jayapura city based on the Bargaining Model, the
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Bureaucratic Model, and the System Model. The result
aims to capture how Jayapura City manages inequalities
based on Pondys’ organizational conflict model.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Over the years the government of Indonesia created affirmative policies to solve inequality problem of
indigenous Papuans and by giving them privileges to
manage their land based on Law 21 the Year 2001 on
the Special Autonomy of Papua Province. By looking
at the case study of Jayapura City, this research want
to see whether the Special autonomy or the policies by
Mayor Benhur Tomi Mano such as building the Mama
Mama Market (Pasar Mama Papua) and reactivating
the Siskamling, community security system to prevent brawls between groups, works best of the citizen
of Jayapura City. The types of governance during the
different period of rules have an impact on character
building in society. Legitimate coercive power in the
Soekarno (1945-1967) and Soeharto (1967-1998) era created stress to indigenous Papuans. The autonomy policy
given during Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) period
motivated these Papuans to manage the land of their
ancestors on their own. Mayor Mano together with the
three pillars in the city of Jayapura achieved commitment
from his citizen by keeping his administration legitimate,
maintaining order by coercive action, and giving reward
for achievements (Elangovan and Lin Xie, 2000). By
using Pondys’ Organizational Conflict Model, the study
will analyze the source of conflict, different approaches to
manage conflict, and the function of organization norms
of Jayapura City government. The model can capture
the function of public and based on customary law dual
governance system.
Moreover, to analyze the leadership of Mayor Mano as
the “middle man” that unifies between the two systems.
Policies in Papua Province usually are less successful
when local indigenous cultural aspects and political
beliefs are not incurred in the planning and design. The
local government has yet to find solvency to harmonize
different customary law with public regulation. Jayapura
city issues are centered on migrants in search of a better
life in the city. Social and economy are external forces
that redefine and restructure family life to create new
standards, beliefs, and values. In the new environment,
women gain more authority in the household when they
have more opportunity to contribute to the family income
(Foner, 2012).
For more than five decades, indigenous Papuans felt
that they were neglected from development and marginalized on the land inherited from their ancestors. They
expressed their frustration with violent means to gain
attention from policymakers in fighting for their rights.
Goal divergence was the source of conflict when two parties who must cooperate on some joint activity are unable
to reach a consensus on concerted action. In response to
the problem, the central governments released Law No
21 the Year 2001 by giving them Special Autonomy to
manage their land. This regulation was made available
as an instrument for local authorities to suppress social
resentment of its’ citizen, as potential accumulated anger
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can explode when there is a trigger. In the city, competition forms the basis for conflict due to aggregated
demands of citizen for resources exceed the resources
available for them to live. Conflict arises when one party
either seeks to exercise control over some activity that
another party regards as his area or seeks to insulate itself
from such control.
Further, in this section, conflict cases from Jayapura
City will be elaborated based on the bargaining model,
bureaucratic model, and system model. Each will elaborate in which conflict episode sequence is and how each
stakeholder relates to one another. The cases of each
model will identify whether the conflict is in the stage of
potential conflict; cognition of perceived conflict; affection of felt conflict, manifested conflict behavior, or as
the conflict aftermath.
The Bargaining Model
Jayapura city administration is divided into fourteen
villages, fourteen sub-villages, and twelve indigenous
villages. The city has two governance systems, one is
the government bureaucracy, and the other is based on
customary law led by indigenous leaders called Ondoafi
or Ondofolo. The city is pressure by incoming settlers
both legal and illegal affecting the demographic composition of the area. Different composition of ethnicity
has potentials to emerge as conflicts when values central
to each personality are not respected. These migrations
drives land induces conflicts in three directions. First
is when landowners and villagers in Jayapura city are
disturbed by the presence of encroaching illegal settlers
from the mountain areas. The second is conflict when the
government needs common land to provide significant
structural development for the general interest. The third
is the land clearance of illegal occupied state-owned land
to build construction of public use in urban areas; as
conveyed by the head of Inter-Religion Communication
Forum (FKUB):
“Suatu waktu akan terjadi konflik, konflik itu bisa
terjadi menjadi tiga arah. Pemilik tanah dengan suku
yang datang yang kemudian itu dengan pemerintah.”
[At once conflict will happen, it will happen into three
directions. A landowner with the incoming settler, and
with the government] (Fr. Willem Itaar, March 26, 2018)
Based on the bargaining model, this sections analyzed how Mayor Benhur Tomi Mano deals with conflicts
among parties and interest groups in Jayapura city, to
foresee potential latent conflict from: 1) competition for
scarce resources; 2) the drive for autonomy; 3) divergence
of subunit goals. Informal norms have to have sufficient
trust and social capital able to withstand high behavioral
and environmental uncertainties. Informal social ties is
a personalized process pushed by horizontal peers. On
the other hand, formal ties are depersonalized processes
enforced by a vertical authority. Strong informal ties are
when the institution is strong with trust among the citizen. Weak-informal ties have to do with culture, religion,
ethics, and the role of the clan. Strong-formal is related
to cognition of the law and governance. Weak-formal
is about market and delegation (Li, 2007). Community
ties of household are friends and relatives as principal
essential resources (Wellman and Wortley, 1990).
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Regulatory mechanisms have usually evolved to guarantee the orderly allocation of scarce resources. In the
case of Jayapura city, groups of people in the society, due
to past issues, they adhere more to indigenous Papuans
customary law system rather than public administrative mechanism. Many indigenous Papuans do not own
citizen identity card (KTP), nor does not understand all
the administrative papers needed such as the family card
(Kartu Keluarga) to be legal citizen living in the territory of Indonesia. In 2000, indigenous mountain people
migrated by foot and ships to centers of development in
Merauke, Kaimana, Manokwari, and Biak. In Jayapura
city, they occupy fringe areas in North Jayapura, South
Jayapura, Abepura, Heram, Entrop, Gurabesi, Tanjung
Ria Dok IX, Hamadi, and Youtefa (Jones and Suhartini,
2014) and create tension with the landowner of Nafri,
Yoka, and Yahim villages (Riani and Pudjihardjo, 2012).
Informal settlers in this city reach more than 25% of
the population. They can occupy land and build semipermanent low-quality houses by having informal or
written permits from the landowner or the Ondoafi, with
compensation informs of cash, in-kind, or share of interest, as stated by the Chief of Ondoafi Association (LMA):
“Kampung di sini itu punya Ondoafi, punya otoritas
yang tidak bisa diganggu oleh kampung lain.” [Their
Ondoafi rules the village here with authority that cannot
be trespass by other villages] George Awi, March 28,
2018.
Government regulation proved to have failed in controlling the expansion of these types of encroachment.
In this situation, informal leaders frustrate the function
of public authority by manipulating social structures
and influence (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006). The explanation behind this is that the administration becomes
irrelevant if it fails to incur social and political changes
in the recruitment mechanism as political power-play will
take over (Groeneveld and Van de Walle, 2010). Jayapura
city should recruit individuals in the bureaucracy that is
keen to increase minority group access of indigenous
Wamena Papuans. Public bureaucracy has to have similar
values and beliefs to the population it represents (Sowa
and Selden, 2003).
Another trigger of conflict involving the two governance systems in the city is land tenure. Customary
land (hak ulayat) in Jayapura is the city administrative
problems. Customary lands are prohibited from selling to
foreigners because it is a cultural identity. Public government ignores and often don not understand customary
law and their governance structure. As a result, the public
government creates conflict in two ways: first is publishing land permits for individual ownership, which is
against customary rules. Weak capacity of government
officials in the sub-village office (Lurah) office adds the
problem. There are no maps of land ownership boundaries present in the office causing some land to have more
than one owner. Second, compensation for the release
of land is different between the public system based on
individual permit ownership and the indigenous system
whereas payment should be based on each tribal mechanism. When conflict arises due to issues of land, the
military and the police will be regarded as an outsider
in this situation, as explained by the Chief of Ondoafi

38

International Journal of Administrative Science & Organization, January 2019
Bisnis & Birokrasi: Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi dan Organisasi

Association (LMA):
“Di sinilah peran pemerintah untuk membuat peraturan daerah untuk mengatur…terbitnya surat pelepasan
hak, dan para pejabat terutama lurah dan distrik, dia juga
harus ada peta di kantornya…ini tidak ada di tingkat
kelurahan maupun distrik. Akhirnya dia jual di atas jual
ke BPN, itu yang saya bilang potensi konflik, karena tidak
tertibnya administrasi.” [This is the role of the government to issue local regulation ... the issuance of the release
of rights letter, and the role of sub-district and village
office official, he also must have a map at his office ... this
is not available at the village level also district. At the end
he sells land of owned land to the National Land Agency
(BPN), I see this as a potential conflict, because of the
disorderly administration.], George Awi 28 Maret 2018.
The wisdom and final decision of the Ondoafi in
charge will be taken as the final say. A local regulation
(Perda) is needed to bridge between national regulations
and indigenous norms.
A conflict case of customary for extensive structural
development is the building of the Holtekamp Bridge,
a national construction project. Conflicts arose when
the provincial government paid the compensation fee
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to the wrong village the Tobati village and not to the
Enggros village. The payment was also not according to customary mechanism and calculation. Willem
Itaar, Chief of Ondoafi Association (LMA) mediated
the conflict. He advocated for proper payment based
on the land price in Kota Raja. The landowners receive
less than this and blame the government for creating
the conflict. In this case conflict, it is a complicated
relationship, involving integrative (cooperative) and distributive (competitive) sub processes. Each of them aims
to have the most significant total resources and to secure
a large share for themselves. Solving these kinds of
conflicts, integrative sub processes argue to have joint
problem solving, while the distributive sub processes
will calculate based on strategic bargaining. By involving the head of the LMA, each party attempt to secure
backing from the third party as strategic management
(Walton and McKersie, 1991). Mayor Mano took over
the negotiation with the Ondoafi, asking for support
of the Hamadi-Holtekamp Bridge, on their indigenous
land. President Jokowi monitored the bridge on April
11, 2008, and the Provincial Government of Papua also
monitors its progress.

Figure 2. Holtekamp Bridge

Source: Processed by the author (2018)

Ignorance of the dual governance system in Jayapura
city and probably also in other areas of Papua Provinces
is costly. Most of the civil infrastructure construction and
policy deliverance work with the Provincial government
office, and seldom further. Problems arising are that the
government official in the city or district level is not well
informed of the policies or projects running. When the
project ends and is given to the city or district administrative responsibilities for maintenance, they feel indifferent
and do not have the feeling of ownership.
Downtown in the city of Jayapura, indigenous Papua
women called “mama”, were gradually marginalized by
development and from incoming settlers. Indigenous
mamas sell their produce on the street while watching
another sellers from outside Papua occupying all the stalls
in the market. This condition triggered them to fight for
their rights. The “Role Conflict Model”, sees an organization composing of a focal person and his role sender
with their own sets of role collection to define the conceptual analysis. Role conflict escalates, when a person

is designated to a new role and demanded to meet a new
role set or a new identity by the new environment (Hoang
and Gimeno, 2005). Relationship conflict is when the
interpersonal condition is incompatible. While task conflict happens when members of a group have a different
viewpoint regarding their duties (Hulsheger, Anderson,
and Salgado, 2009; Kostopoulos and Bozionelos, 2011).
This model can be used to analyze the potential conflict concerning Papuans mama. Indigenous Papuans
selling on the street joint forces and formed an organization called the “Solidaritas Pedagang Asli Papua”, or
Solpap, which translate to Indigenous Papuans Seller
Solidarity. They advocate for a building that functions
as a market, exclusively for indigenous mama-mama.
The demonstration was held at the mayors’ office and
pushed for regulations that can accommodate to make
the building a reality. The Mayor of Jayapura City, Dr.
Benhur Tomi Mano, MM., responded to Solpap request
by providing land for the building. In this case, conflict
resolution will try to decrease the demands of parties
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involved or increase the pool of resources asked. To make
the building a reality, Mayor Mano flew to Jakarta to
sign an MoU with Perum Damri, the public company
for passenger and goods services for buses and trucks,
that owns the land. “Mama-mama Market” was part of
the promise of President Jokowi campaign, the central
government rallied state-owned enterprises (BUMN)
to provided financial support and gave the authority to
the city government to oversee the management of the
market. In the decentralization era, Mayor Mano acts as
the representative of the central government and has the
authority to direct policy and programs by implementing
planned change, regulated change, conflictive change,
and competitive change (Van de Ven and Sun, 2011).
Members of Solpap was relieved when their wish had
become a reality, as stated by a Solpap activist:
“Mama dari pasar lama…kitong perjuangkan pasar
sudah sembilan belas tahun baru Jokowi resmikan.”
[Mama came from the old market, we fought for the
market for nineteen years until inaugurated by Jokowi],
mama pinang seller at Mama-mama Market, May 11,
2018
After 19 years of the struggle, President Jokowi and
the first lady opened the three-story market place that is
located in Gurabesi, North Jayapura.

Figure 3. Mama Mama Market

Source: Processed by the author (2018)

A new problem emerge, the market was not supported
with a business plan. Negative rumors spread that only
native Papuans can come or sell in the market; this rumor
hindered customers from visiting the new and modern
market. The mama needed longer more extended time
to sell their produce as recorded:
“Di sini kurang pengunjung, ini mama jual ada yang
seratus ribu, dua puluh ribu, dan sepuluh ribu. Mama
keluar modal empat ratus ribu baru habis dua sampai tiga
hari, dari situ hanya untung duaratus limapuluh ribu. Di
pasar lama modal empat ratus ribu untung satu juta, habis
hari itu juga.” [Fewer visitors are coming here, mama
sells (different sets) for one hundred thousand, twenty
thousand, and ten thousand. Mama used the capital of
four hundred thousand, was only sold out after two to
three days; from there the profit is only two hundred
fifty thousand. In the old market, with capital of four
hundred thousand, one million profit and finish on the
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same day], mama pinang seller at Mama-mama Market,
May 11, 2018.
Market mechanisms have usually evolved to guarantee the orderly allocation of scarce resources. The new
“Mama-mama Market” building concept is a one-stop
shopping as part of the city’s public service. Mama-mama
sellers were reluctant to use the provided selling tables as
they are not accustomed, thus spread a mat on floors to
sell their produce, as distributed by the head of Jayapura
City Department of Religion who has lived there for a
long time:
“Pembangunan tidak dibarengi dengan analisis (business plan). Bahwa pasar adalah pertemuan antara penjual
dan pembeli. Sebenarnya pasar yang baru adalah “one
stop shopping”, ada tiga lantai, sebagai dari layanan
publik. Namun para mama pada gelar tikar, katanya bawa
barang berat, terbiasa duduk di lantai. Nah, ini kan salah
analisis.” [The construction was not accompanied by
analysis (business plan). The market is a meeting between
sellers and buyers. Actually, the new market is "one-stop
shopping", as part of public services with three floors.
But the mama spread a mat on floors, because they bring
heavy items, (and) used to sitting on floors. Well, this is
a wrong analysis], Syamsuddin, May 8, 2018.
The second and third floor was too challenging for
them to carry their heavy produce upstairs. The effort
from the management of the market building is by holding regular trainings to enhance the sellers’ capacity
for free.
The Bureaucratic Model
The instrument used to reduce poverty and create
welfare by giving authority to local leaders in managing
their areas is using administrative expansion (pemekaran). This approach was successful when Jayapura City
was expanded from Jayapura District. However, the
instrument did not work for administrative areas in the
mountains of Papuan Province. The Bureaucratic Model
helps understand how institutions along vertical hierarchical dimension are affected by external pressure and
how they respond, mainly to prevent conflict. The areas
that are established by administrative expansion are the
districts of Jayapura, Manokwari, Paniai, Biak Numfor,
Yapen Waropen, and Nabire. These areas have an average poverty rate of 49.76% as enabling an environment
for potential conflict. Four more districts were expanded,
they are Supiori, Jayawijaya, Yahukimo, Tolikara, and
Jayapura City (Central Bureau of Statistic, 2015). The
policy didn’t work for most of the district areas, therefore based on the model; actions of the citizen have to
be interpreted by looking at the context of the situation.
The mountain people districts preferred to migrate by
foot to more secure areas near the coast. Most of them
are the middle-class families with farming skills that
provide food for the village and nurture the vulnerable
groups of elderly, pregnant women, and children. Unlike
Papuans living at the coast that are more open to foreign
acculturation, the people of Wamena takes pride in their
culture and believes. Migration of the middle class and
rigid culture frustrate those who are left behind. No one
remains in these villages to pass down farming skills
and local wisdom to the younger generation. In 1998, a
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program to aid the poor called “Raskin” reach these areas.
The village social condition is negatively affected when
the aids are up to six month undelivered due to shipping
problems leading to malnourishment problems. The lack
of jobs available and no farming skill pressured families
to poverty. Most of them turn to alcohol or are involved
in criminal activities. The Special Autonomy policy was
design to solve poverty issues of indigenous Papuans.
However, village leaders neither in the mountain and
coastal areas have never heard nor seen the procedure,
as explained by the Head of Jayapura Inter-Religions
Forum (FKUB):
“Undang-undang ini (Otsus) juga belum pernah
disosialisasikan secara baik mengenai pasal yang mengatur tentang kehidupan karena (dipersepsikan) dalam
rangka menjawab seluruh kebutuhan hidup masyarakat
dari Papua yang mengatur secara khusus, (atau) sebuah
jembatan di mana Papua akan merdeka. Secara riil saya
belum pernah lihat, saya belum pernah rasa undangundang itu secara utuh.” [This law (Special Autonomy)
has also never been adequately socialized regarding the
articles governing life because (it is perceived) to answer
all the needs in the presence of Papuans in a specific
regulation (or) as a bridge for Papua independence. In
fact I have never seen it; I have never felt the law as a
whole.] Fr. Willem Itaar, March 26, 2018.
Involving city and district government is essential to
bridge communication with indigenous system governance to progress a policy. Due to inadequate training
and outreach design, local government staff had a hard
time interpreting the Special Autonomy policy.
In society, alcohol addiction grew to be disturbing
in all area of Papua Province. As a reaction, Provincial
Government published Papua Province Regulation
No. 15 the Year 2013 that Prohibits to Supply, Storage,
Distribute, Sale, and Production of Alcohol Beverage,
based on the aspirations from local governments. The
provincial regulation is bureaucratic steps to substitute
impersonal rules with personal control on matters of
alcoholic beverages.
The District of Jayapura accepts and implements the
regulation. However, the city government of Jayapura
neglects this law because the provincial law has no
national legal basis concerning the production and
supply of alcohol based drinks. This situation is called
the “zone of indifference”, when there are different
expectation between the superior and the subordinate.
When a bureaucratic organization grows more substantial, the needs, interest, or goals between superior and the
assistant differ affecting the delegation to the subunits
of organizations. Jayapura city autonomy is threatened
as the city holds the right based on national regulation.
National regulation states that only the capital city of
Jakarta and the capital city of each Province are allowed
to sell alcohol beverages. I cannot be aborted or changed
by local regulations, as what the Provincial Government
of Papua did by having Papua Province Regulation No.
15 the Year 2013, as explained by the former Head of
National and Politics Unity Agency (Kesbangpol):
“Jadi kita di kota tidak (ada) perda tentang penghapusan dan pelarangan (alcohol) yang di provinsi bikin.
Berarti yang boleh menjual minuman keras adalah kota
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Jakarta, dan ibu kota provinsi. Jadi Kota Jayapura tidak
salah sudah merujuk kepada peraturan yang lebih tinggi.”
[We in the city do not (have) regulations concerning the
abolition and prohibition (of alcohol) that the province
made. That means that those who are allowed to sell
liquor are the city of Jakarta and the capital city of the
Provinces. So the city of Jayapura has correctly referred
to the higher regulations] Evret N. Merauje, March 17,
2018.
In reconciling the relationship between the provincial
regulations with those of the city is by having reconciliation efforts that are sensitive and answer the victims
feeling of unjust. Successful reconciliation is when forgiveness and restoration of trust are available between
the two conflicting agencies (Andiappan and Trevino,
2011). In Jayapura City, the permit to supply, distribute,
and sell alcoholic drink is owned by Rudi Maswi, the
owner of the supermarket chain Sumber Makmur, Jaya
Makmur, and Saga. Alcohol sold on these premises is
legal. The city government does not publish permits to
local business owners. Jayapura city is drafting a special
regulation on sales of alcoholic beverages by raising the
tax to distributors to limit public access to alcohol drinks.
Purchases will only be legal in pubs and hotels as part of
the tourism service.
Another challenge faced by Jayapura city is the
increased distribution of marijuana and imported new
modes of criminal activities involving children. This condition creates fear among the citizen especially for those
whose work until night. Interview with local “Taksi” bus
driver revealed that many people high from marijuana
are to be found in the city after eight p.m., especially at
Expo Terminal. To keep themselves safe, Taksi drivers
usually prepare protection rackets of five thousand or ten
thousand Rupiah to prevent attacks from these groups
of criminal, as explained below by the “Taksi” driver of
route Youtefa Market to Perumnas III:
“Kaka, hati-hati kalau pulang malam jangan lewat
dari jam 20.00. Di sini banyak orang mabok. Ini saya
setiap hari selalu bawa duapuluh ribu – tigapuluh ribu
untuk dipalakin sama orang (mabok itu), kadang saya
kasih lima ribu, kadang sepuluh.” [Sister, be careful not
to return home after 8:00 p.m., many drunk people are
around. I will bring twenty thousand or thirty thousand
every day - as prevention if I meet (drunken) people,
sometimes I give five thousand, sometimes ten] “Taksi”
driver Mei 6, 2019.
Marijuana is transported to Jayapura city from neighboring Papua New Guinea (PNG) in a small plastic bag
hand carried. They cross the border from the woods until
the roadway and take the “Taksi” to Abepura. Another
way to enter the city is via sea by boat, by traveling until
Hamadi. On February 2018, the Provincial Police Head,
Inspector General Police, Drs. Boy Rafli Amar, MH,
declared narcotics as an urgent problem in Papua. A
meeting with the city and district level government of
Papua Province came to the conclusion that Papua has
become the market for narcotics and illegal drugs, mostly
transported from the borders of PNG.
Manifested conflicts involving open aggression with
verbal and physical violence are dealt with by the socalled “Three Pillars” of the city: the public government,
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the police, and the military. They are responsible for
conflict management and security of public order
(Kamtibmas). Each of these institutions has its administration, bureaucracy, and leaders. The chief of Jayapura
City Police (Kapolresta), Police Grand Commissioner
Adjutant Gustav Robby Urbinas, SH., S.IK led the fight
against criminal activities by declaring, “No to illegal
alcoholic drinks, drugs, and gambling”. He rallied support from the Mayor, the military and important local
leaders. Strict directions are used to control Criminal
disturbance such as motor theft (curanmor) and activities using sharp weapons (sajam). Urbinas permitted to
police officers under his authority to shoot delinquents
on the spot for criminal activities involving violence
and weapons (Evarukdijati, 2018). Perpetrators will be
prosecuted under Law 12 the Year 1951. “Taksi” drivers
praised the Jayapura City Police boldness and felt safer
driving at night.
Security direction from Military Commander 172/
Praja Wira Yakti, Colonel Infantry Jonathan Binsar
Parluhutan Sianipar for Military District 1701/Jayapura,
Military District 1702/Jayawijaya, and Military District
1712/Sarmi, stated that the backbone of territorial
management are soldiers posted to aid village development (Babinsa), the Subdistrict Military Commander
(Danramil), and the intelligence section to work together
with the police, village leaders. He commanded to reactivate the traditional neighborhood security system
(Siskamling) again. “Siskamling” posts are built and
shared with the community assistance police (Binmas)
to be closer to the community. Mayor Mano declared his
support to the police and the military. He reminded the
citizens of Jayapura City to participate in community
security by taking part in the “Siskamling” system with
neighborhood coordinator (RT) and hamlet coordinator
(RW) as field leaders (Jayapura City, 2018).

Figure 4. Inauguration of the Security Post (Jayapura City
Government, 2018)
Source: Processed by the author (2018)

On April 2017, the Head of Papua Province Police,
Inspector General Pol. Drs. Paulus Waterpauw, launch an
android application called the “Noken of Jayapura City
Police Office”, to enhance public participation in fighting crime together. In addition to that, 12 CCTVs were
installed in strategic locations and are connected to this
application. Members of the society can report criminal
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attack directly via their smartphone by downloading the
“Noken” Application. The report will pop up in form of a
red blinking dot at the monitor installed in the City Policy
(Polresta) front desk. The police in charge will call back
the victim to confirm and direct what the caller should do
next. Police officers will be assigned from the city policy
office or the nearest city unit to help on site. Another
telecommunication-based collaboration by Police Grand
Commissioner Adjutant Urbinas is by signing MoU with
Telkomsel to launch SMS Broadcast with messages on
public security (Ridwan, 2018).
Mayor Mano responsiveness to preventing conflict by
gathering or visiting local leaders and community organizations (paguyuban), aims to create tolerance between
the different ethnic, religious, and indigenous-incoming
settlers. He will organize meeting with the relevant
departments after receiving information on a potential
conflict from the intelligence. He serves as the middle
manager between the central government and the people
living in Jayapura city, as an interface to connect actors
and domains and break resistance from the community
(Huy, 2002; Wooldridge, Schmid, and Floyd, 2008).
The System Model
Jayapura as the capital city of Papua Provinces has
a very diverse demographic composition. The challenge
for the city government is to provide public services and
maintain order to guarantee economic development. The
market is central to the life of people living in Jayapura,
where indigenous Papuans and incoming settlers sell their
products. By using the system model, the lateral relationship of the city government with indigenous Papuans,
incoming settlers, and indigenous Papuans are residing
in Jayapura and PNG.
The population growth of Jayapura city from 2005
to 2010 is 2.44% annually, with the highest increase in
Muara Tami District of 5.1% due to spontaneous migration, and the lowest in South Jayapura. The density in
Muara Tami is 626.7 km2 or 66.7% from the total area of
Jayapura City. In 2017, most of the average expenditure
per capita in a month for food consumption was about
44.33 % from overall spending per capita in the city. A
study on the potential asset for the income of Jayapura
city in 2013, shows that the highest retribution contributing to the town from the market and terminal could
reach Rp.30,189,520,000.-. Retribution is effectively only
19.29% because market facilities are not used following
the purpose; the sellers are not paying the full price of
the retribution, and the officer in charge does not give
ticket on payment. Flooding affected Youtefa market in
Abepura the worst, and when the market is flooded, it
causes closure for several days without any economic
activities (Central Bureau of Statistic, 2017).
The relationship between indigenous Papuans and
incoming settlers are conflicting on power distribution,
resource management, and problems related to politics,
economy, and social issues. It has caused the inequalities
in racial imbalance, gender discrimination, and pay gap
affecting racialized beliefs and practice (Acker, 2006).
The source of resentment between the groups is due
to the widening income gap between the second and
third generation offspring of indigenous Papuans against
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migrants over the years. The first generation came to
Irian Jaya in 1960 under the Dutch Colonial transmigration policy. In the Soekarno era, this policy is continued
under the “National Transmigration Movement” or
Gerakan Tramsmigrasi Nasional. The land in Jayapura
was suitable for agriculture, and the migrants produced
rice, secondary crop (palawija), chilies, cucumbers, and
others. Dosay, an area 60 km from the city had been supplying vegetables to the town. The area also has cocoa
and coffee plantation. Arso, a well develop transmigration
area 20 km from the city produces vegetables and fruits
and has a palm tree plantation. Transmigrant families
in this area were happy with their produce and market
profit and brought their families from Java to expand
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their cultivation. Spontaneous migrants raised up to
160,000 in the year 1983 adding pressure to the urban
city that started to impact indigenous Papuans mamas’
(Hasting, 1983). This felt conflict become a potential
latent conflict that will break out if there is a trigger of
symbolic ones. The migrant offspring could compete in
the market system and could earn between one to three
million Rupiah per day. On the other hand, the families of indigenous Papuans from different villages in the
Province are making less by the year. This study asked
randomly to indigenous mama-mama, transmigration
settlers, and incoming settlers, all from the second or
third generations on their income as sellers in the market
all over town to confirm the situation, as follow Table 1.

Table 1. Income of Indigenous Papuans versus Incoming Settlers

No.

Mama Origin

1

Wamena

2

Nabire

3
4
5
6

Initial
Capital
Pinang 400,000

Selling

Noken

100,000

Pangkep
Rice
3 mill
(migrant)
Biak
Pinang 500,000
Probolinggo
Fruits
3 mill
(Transmigrant)
Jayapura
Pinang 500,000

Gross
Income
250,000/2 days drops 1 mil/day at old market
300 - 400,000 changed from vegetable sellers
because unable to compete with supermarket

Mama Papua

1 - 3 mill/day

Skouw

30,000/day drops from 70,000/day

Hamadi

500,000 - 2 mill/month

Koya

100,000 drops from 1 mill/day in old market

Youtefa

Market

Mama Papua

Source: Processed by the author (2018)

We wanted to know what caused indigenous Papuans,
especially the mamas’ for their inability to compete and
found that their belief and teachings affected the most.
Indigenous Mamas’ believe that economic wealth, body
health, and daily food for a living are provided by the
Devine and have no correlation with market mechanism.
They are uneasy with the concept of competition because
resources to live are provided by Mother Nature. The
exploitation of life and the shrinking land due to the
expansion of the city decreased fertile cultivation land
thus less produce. Another negative impact is environmental degradation and pollution affecting the health
of Papuans. The feeling of helplessness and frustration
became anger and resentment towards settlers who in
their view has taken over their land.
The Behavior of the mama in the market also helps
understand why government policies are not bearing fruit
for them. In the market, indigenous mama-mama only
sells fish, fruit, or vegetables without any motivation to
process these raw materials further into various other
forms of food or product aiming for a higher profit. In
most cases, they set a fixed price to their products and
don’t understand the concept of diminishing quality. They
don’t give away bonus as a strategy to keep customers
coming back but let close friend or family take their produce for free too often, as explained by the Coordinating
Ministry of Politics, Law, and Security:
“Kalau mama Papua jual pinang satu bukit sepuluh
ribu, nggak bisa ditawar. Sedangkan pendatang boleh

ditawar, boleh delapan ribu. Mereka tidak paham bahwa
(pinang) berlaku timbangan menyusut, kalau kualitas
menurun, mereka akan merugi.” [When Papuan mamas
sell one stack of Pinang for ten thousand, this is nonnegotiable. On the other hand, incoming settlers are
open to bargain, eight thousand is acceptable. They don’t
understand that (pinang) has traits of diminishing quality;
they will loss.] Papua Desk, May 25, 2018.
In this endless conflicting lateral relationship between
indigenous Papuans and incoming settler, Pondy (1967)
suggest to having funding available as an incentive
system. This mechanism is already available based on
the funding earmarking under the Special Autonomy
affirmative policy. We have explained earlier that it is
not helping push indigenous Papuans to help them further their welfare because the policy only focuses on
the budget allocation. Government officials as frontline
facing communities are not well trained to help them
understand the policies and what kind of program they
should implement. Most crucial of all, customary land
and the villagers are ruled by the Ondoafis or Ondofolos,
yet many of them never saw or understood about the law
giving privilege to them and their rights. Pondy suggest
that government should make sure that parties are not
competing for the same resources. Based on our observation, in most market, six to eight stalls are selling the same
produce sitting next to each other. An area such as Arso
is a well-established agriculture producer managed by
second or third generation offspring of mostly Javanese
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families. They provide the most significant numbers of
products in the market. The economic system rules the
market. Administrators with a lack of attention to social
structure, and its consequences are prone to be manipulated to skilled political entrepreneurs (Balkundi and
Kilduff, 2006).
Another matter concerning indigenous Papuans is
their kinship ties of the Melanesian race. This anthropological bond is stronger than administrative identities
such as ID Cards or country borders. One such case is
Mosso villagers; they work in the village from Monday
to Thursday, and then cross to PNG to stay there from
Friday to Sunday. Both the Indonesian government and
the government of PNG keep its borders flexible for these
constantly migrating Melanesian. This kind of regulation
maintains internal equilibrium by enabling situation for
communication exchange (Jarzabkowski and Paul Spee,
2009). Mayors from the surrounding area in both of the
country, signed an MoU to regulate programs in solving
problems of the society. These important steps was represented by Charles Malenki, mayor of Wewak from the
Province of East Sepik; Koim Trilu Leaky, Mayor of Lae
from the Province of Morobe, and the Mayor of Bololo
from the Province of Morobe, PNG, with Mayor DR.
Benhur Tomi Mano, MM of Jayapura City on issues of
border, economic, and agricultural programs. Annually,
the government sends Indonesian language teachers to
schools in PNG as a social strategy (Jayapura City, 2018).
Hostilities are reduced utilizing athletic activities by
sending youth football club called “Tunas Muda Hamadi”
to a football tournament in Momas Wewak, Papua New
Guinea. These policies aim to guarantee indigenous
Melanesian to have economic and social interaction in a
peaceful environment.
CONCLUSION
The study analyzes affirmative policies implemented
by the central government or programs initiated by
Jayapura city mayor by using Pondys’ Organizational
Conflict Model, to understand which works best in solving problems related to indigenous Papuans and inequality
in the city. Pondy models focus on the conflict in organizations and suggest ways to manage the conflicts to have a
positive effect on the organization. The instruments can
be informed of market or legislative instrument that takes
into account individuals living in the city.
In Jayapura city and all over Papua Province, the customary law based governance and indigenous ties have
a stronger role that the public system. Cultural aspects
and local beliefs should be incurred in city planning for
policies to succeed. Local regulation (Perda) can bridge
between national regulations and indigenous norms.
National infrastructure construction and policy deliverance in Papua should involve city or district government
closely. They are representative of the central government
and have the authority to direct policy and programs.
The conflict between indigenous Papuans and migrants
is due to the widening gap of economy, power, social
and political issues. Administrative approaches should
take into account indigenous beliefs and teachings to put
forward the city program “Prospect” from the Special
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Autonomy budget.
The limitation of the researcher is the inability to
observe the impact of policies on the village level for
an extended period due to logistical condition. Local
enumerators that work on social, economic, and political issues were recruited to guide in-depth interviews
and observe the Ondoafis in solving social conflicts. The
researcher experienced that administrative science could
explain the implementation of policies from the national
level from an inward-looking perspective. Theories from
political science and anthropological science ware needed
to explain phenomena at the local level involving indigenous Papuans. Future research is required to understand
better the background of a massive expansion of indigenous Papuans from the mountains to emerging cities in
Papua Provinces and why administrative development
failed to halt this process.
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